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Defending State’s Rights Under the
Coastal Zone Management Act—
State of California v. Norton
by Linda Krop*

T

Introduction

he 2002 decision in State of California v. Norton1 provides a unique insight into the history and evolution of
the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),2 a powerful and as yet underutilized federal environmental law. This
case also reveals the respective roles of the legislative, judicial,
and executive branches in coastal protection and governance.
As this Article will discuss, the debate centers on the respective
roles of the federal government and coastal states in addressing
coastal resources and activities. In State of California v. Norton,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the broad role of states in reviewing
activities that may affect their coastal zones, even though such
activities are under the direct
authority of the federal government.3

History and Background of the CZMA

The intent of the CZMA
was to ensure proper
“coordination and
cooperation” between the
federal government and
coastal states.

The CZMA came about
as the federal government and
coastal states were engaged in
a decades-long struggle over
offshore regulatory authority,
including matters regarding offshore oil and gas development.
Both the federal government and
the states sought exclusive control over offshore areas, in order
to regulate and protect these areas, but also to ensure ownership
of (and thus economic interest in) mineral and other resources.
Beginning in the 1930s, both Congress and California
attempted to assert jurisdiction over offshore energy resources.4
In 1945, President Truman concurred with Congress and
claimed federal authority over all offshore resources.5 In 1947,
the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of federal jurisdiction
over all offshore resources.6 Thus, all three branches of the federal government agreed that areas offshore were to be regulated
at a national level. However, coastal states continued to assert
tremendous pressure in favor of shared offshore jurisdiction and,
in 1952, Congress voted to move federal jurisdiction to three
miles offshore. President Truman vetoed the bill, but his opponent in the presidential race, Dwight Eisenhower, promised to
support the bill and the expanded role of coastal states. Eisenhower was elected President and supported new legislation
in 1953 that established state jurisdiction out to three nautical
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miles offshore. This law is known as the Submerged Lands Act.7
Federal oversight of oil and gas development activities beyond
three nautical miles from shore was ensured later that same year
when Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(“OCSLA”).8
Despite Congress’s attempt to resolve these disputes,
coastal states remained dissatisfied with the compromise and
the federal assertion of jurisdiction off their borders. Activities beyond three miles from shore could still have a substantial
effect on a state’s coastline, as so prominently demonstrated by
the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.9 This spill—“the spill heard
around the world”—occurred after a blowout at Platform A, a
Union Oil Company (“Union”)
drilling platform located in federal waters approximately six
miles from the California coast.
10
The U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) had waived the
requirement for casing in the
wells drilled from the platform,11
even though casing helps to prevent oil and gas from escaping
the well.12 The USGS agreed to
allow Union to install casing to
a depth of 239 feet instead of
the federal and state standard of
880 feet.13 As a result of the lack
of casing throughout the depth
of the drilling wells, a blowout occurred and over three million
gallons of oil released into coastal waters, blackening over 35
miles of pristine beaches.14 This spill heightened the concerns
of not only Californians, but other coastal states as well, which
were vulnerable to the environmental consequences of decisions
made by the federal government.15

The Coastal Zone Management Act
The CZMA represented Congress’s next attempt to address
the ongoing concerns of coastal states. Although the CZMA did
not change the jurisdictional boundaries already set forth in the
Submerged Lands Act and OCSLA, it offered states an enhanced
role in federal planning and permitting decisions that affect their
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coasts.16 The intent of the CZMA was to ensure proper “coordination and cooperation” between the federal government and
coastal states.17 The key to ensuring this coordination and cooperation was the requirement for consistency review. Pursuant to
this provision, activities carried out or approved by the federal
government that affect a state’s coastal zone must comply with
the state’s coastal laws and policies.18
The CZMA provides a two-step process towards securing federal-state coordination and cooperation. First, states are
encouraged to prepare coastal management programs that will
manage, protect, and conserve coastal resources.19 The CZMA
sets forth several areas of national concern that must be addressed
in a state’s coastal program. These include, for example, protection of natural resources and water quality.20 The state’s program
must be approved by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”), a branch of the U.S. Department of
Commerce.21
Once NOAA certifies a state’s program, the CZMA requires
that activities carried out or approved by the federal government
must be consistent with the state’s approval program.22 There are
three types of activities subject to state consistency review: (1)
activities proposed by federal agencies; (2) private activities that
require federal approval; and (3)
offshore oil exploration, development, and production plans
that are submitted for federal
approval under OCSLA.23
Federal agency activities
include those activities proposed and carried out by the
federal government. The CZMA
requires that such activities
“shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the
maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of
approved State management programs.”24 Under this provision
of the CZMA, the federal agency makes a “consistency determination” and submits it to the state for review.25
Private applicants seeking a license or permit from a federal agency are also subject to the consistency requirement of
the CZMA.26 The Act provides that an application for a federal
license or permit must include “a certification that the proposed
activity complies with the enforceable policies of the state’s
approved program and that such activity will be conducted in
a manner consistent with the program.”27 The state then has the
ability to review the application for consistency with its coastal
management program. A state may concur with, or object to, the
consistency certification.28
Similarly, an application for approval of an offshore oil and
gas exploration or development and production plan must also
include a certification that the activity will be carried out in a
manner consistent with the state’s approved coastal management
program.29 As with private licenses and permits, the state may
concur with, or object to, a consistency certification.30
There are two key differences between consistency review

of federal agency activities (i.e., those activities carried out by a
federal agency) and private activities that must be approved by
federal agencies. First, unlike privately proposed actions, which
must be conducted in a manner consistent with a state’s coastal
program, a federal agency activity need only be “carried out in a
manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable”
with a state’s program.31 The difference in language allows the
federal government some relief from the consistency requirement; private activities, by contrast, must be found strictly consistent with a state’s coastal program. Second, the CZMA provides
that federal agencies may proceed with a proposed activity even
if a state finds the activity to be inconsistent with its approved
coastal program, whereas a state’s objection to a private application precludes the federal government from issuing a license or
permit.32 These distinctions demonstrate that although Congress
was willing to encourage federal-state coordination and cooperation, it was not willing to give states veto authority over the
actions or proposals of federal agencies.33

Interpreting CZMA
Secretary of the Interior v. California: A Narrow
Reading of the CZMA
In 1981, the State of California and several environmental groups sought consistency
review of a federal oil and gas
lease sale located in the Santa
Maria Basin offshore Santa Barbara County (Lease Sale 53).34
The sale was proposed by the
U.S. Minerals Management
Service (“MMS”), the federal
agency responsible for administering oil and gas leasing and
development under OCSLA.35 California and the other plaintiffs
were concerned that the lease sale could result in an oil spill
that would threaten the southern sea otter.36 They asserted that
this threat was inconsistent with the State’s coastal management program. The MMS, however, refused to allow the State
to review the proposed lease sale for consistency review under
the CZMA.37
The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the State of California, finding that the lease
sale would affect the State’s coastal zone and therefore required
consistency review by the State.38 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.39 The Court placed great reliance on the fact that
the CZMA required a “direct” effect on a state’s coastal zone
in order to trigger the consistency requirement.40 The Supreme
Court found that because the sale of an oil lease only allows
“very limited, ‘preliminary activities,’” and does not grant the
right to “full-scale exploration, development or production,”
it therefore could not result in a “direct” effect on the State’s
coastal zone.41 Instead, the Court pointed out that under OCSLA,
only the subsequent approval of a specific exploration plan
(“EP”) or development and production plan (“DPP”) could result

In 1947, the Supreme
Court confirmed the validity of federal jurisdiction
over all offshore resources.
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in a direct effect on a state’s coastal resources. Accordingly, the
Court noted that consistency review would be appropriate later,
when specific exploration, development or production plans are
submitted for federal approval.42
This decision reinvigorated the controversy over offshore
jurisdiction, and fractured the state-federal compromise that
had been crafted in 1972. The coastal states turned to Congress
again, and when the CZMA was reauthorized in 1990, Congress
responded to Secretary of the Interior v. California by amending the Act to delete the requirement for a “direct” effect and by
clarifying the legislature’s intent for coastal states to be able to
review any activities would affect their coastal zones, whether
directly or indirectly. Congress specifically stated its intent that
states should be allowed to review offshore oil and gas leases.43

State of California v. Norton: A Broad Application
of Consistency Review Under the CZMA
There have been no further lease sales offshore California
since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Secretary of the Interior v.
California. However, in 1999, 40 undeveloped leases located
off the coast of Central California were set to expire unless
“suspended” by MMS. Under OCSLA, an oil and gas lease is
initially granted for five to ten years. If production does not
commence within that time period, the oil lessee must request
a “suspension,” otherwise the lease will expire.44 None of the
leases in question had been produced; therefore they required
suspensions to remain in existence. Because these leases were
sold between 1968 and 1984, their initial sales escaped state
consistency review.45
The forty leases had been suspended previously for a variety
of reasons, including a directed suspension from 1992 to 1999,
during which time MMS conducted a study regarding the potential environmental and socioeconomic effects of development
of the leases on the adjacent coastal communities of Santa Barbara, Ventura and San Luis Obispo Counties.46 When the study
was completed in 1999, MMS notified the lessees that the leases
must be suspended or they would expire.
In response to MMS’s notice, California Governor Gray
Davis asked for a report from the California Coastal Commission
(“Coastal Commission”), the agency responsible for consistency
review under the CZMA, regarding the State’s ability to respond
to the proposed lease suspensions. The Coastal Commission
staff scheduled a public hearing on the matter. In its report, the
Commission staff explained that under Secretary of the Interior
v. California, the state would have to wait for submittal of new
proposed seismic surveys, EPs and DPPs before being allowed
to review the leases for consistency with the State’s coastal management plan.47
In anticipation of the Coastal Commission hearing, a coalition of environmental groups hired the Environmental Defense
Center (“EDC”) to evaluate the State’s role in responding to the
proposed lease suspensions.48 The EDC argued that the 1990
amendments to the CZMA should apply to the lease suspensions, and that the Coastal Commission should be allowed to
review the suspensions for consistency with the State’s coastal
management program.
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At the hearing in June 1999, the Coastal Commission agreed
with the EDC and voted to send a letter to MMS, demanding the
right to review the suspensions. The Commission noted a number of concerns with the leases, including the close proximity
of the leases to the Monterey Bay and Channel Islands National
Marine Sanctuaries, and changed environmental circumstances,
including the expanded range of the southern sea otter, as well as
more stringent air and water quality standards.49
MMS rejected the Coastal Commission’s request, and
instead suspended the leases on November 12, 1999.50 EDC urged
the Commission to challenge the suspensions in court, under the
CZMA. On November 18, 1999, the State of California, through
the Governor, Attorney General and Coastal Commission, filed
a lawsuit challenging not only the failure of MMS to allow the
State to review the lease suspensions under the CZMA, but also
the failure of MMS to conduct environmental review prior to
suspending the leases.51 The oil lessees intervened on behalf of
the federal government, and the three adjacent counties and ten
environmental groups intervened on behalf of the State.52
In their briefs, the state, environmentalists and counties
argued that the lease suspensions should be reviewed by the
state either under section 1456(c)(1) of the CZMA as a federal
agency action, or under section 1456(c)(3)(A) as private licenses
or permits requiring federal agency approval. The plaintiffs also
argued that section 1456(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA, which pertained
to EPs and DPPs, clearly did not apply to the lease suspensions.
MMS claimed that CZMA and National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) review would happen later, when the oil companies submitted EPs and DPPs. MMS even made the “post hoc”
argument that lease suspensions are categorically excluded from
NEPA review.
The district court rejected MMS’s arguments, ruling that
(1) MMS had failed to explain during the environmental review
process why lease suspensions are excluded from environmental
review, and (2) the 1990 CZMA amendments gave the State the
right to review the lease suspensions as a federal agency action
under section 1456(c)(1) of the CZMA.53 The decision placed
significant reliance on the 1990 amendments to the CZMA,
pointing out that the purpose of the 1990 amendments was to
“to overrule Secretary of the Interior.”54 Judge Wilken noted
that “Section 1456(c)(1)(A) was amended to delete the word
‘directly’ modifying ‘affects,’” and that “Congress indicated in
the legislative history that ‘the term “affects” is to be construed
broadly, including direct effects which are caused by the activity and occur at the same time and place, and indirect effects
which may be caused by the activity and are later in time or farther removed in distance but are still reasonably foreseeable.’”55
Finally, the decision cited Congress’ statement that the 1990
amendments were intended “‘to make clear’ that the sale of oil
and gas leases is subject to the CZMA;” and noted that all of the
parties agreed that the 1990 amendment of the CZMA stated oil
and gas lease sales constitute federal agency activities subject to
state consistency review.56 Therefore, the only question left was
whether lease suspensions were also subject to state review.
Judge Wilken answered this question in the affirmative,
56

explaining that “MMS’s grant of the suspensions is a federal activity which it carries out in the exercise of its statutory
duties.”57 She concluded:
Therefore, because of Congress’s intent to require a federal agency to give the State consistency determinations
at the time of the sale of the leases, which did not occur
in this case, and because the MMS’s grant of these suspensions requires activities that affect the coastal zone,
the Court finds that the MMS must provide the State
with a determination that the lease suspensions are consistent with the State’s coastal management program,
pursuant to CZMA § 1456(c)(1).58
MMS and the oil companies appealed. In December 2002,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Wilken’s ruling.59 In an unusually descriptive opinion, the court reviewed
the background of oil and gas development offshore California,
including a discussion of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. The
court recognized that “[s]ome would trace the current framework
of environmental protections in substantial measure directly to
the Santa Barbara spill.”60 Moreover, the court noted that “[o]f
particular relevance here, the federal Coastal Zone Management
Act and California’s Coastal Act
followed in the wake of the spill
and both provided California
substantial oversight authority
for offshore oil drilling in federally controlled areas.”61
The court followed with an
overview of the CZMA, OCSLA,
and NEPA. The Court reiterated that Congress amended the
CZMA in 1990 with the specific
intent of overturning Secretary
of the Interior v. California.62
The court then concluded that
the CZMA required full review
at the lease suspension stage.63
As the court noted, the lease suspensions “represent a significant
decision to extend the life of oil exploration and production off
of California’s coast, with all of the far reaching effect and perils
that go along with offshore oil production.”64 The court rejected
MMS’s argument that the State could wait until submittal of EPs
and DPPs, pointing out that “[a]lthough a lease suspension is
not identical to a lease sale, the very broad and long term effects
of these suspensions more closely resemble the effects of a sale
than they do the highly specific activities reviewed under section (c)(3).”65 Therefore, “section (c)(1) review is available now
for the broader effects implicated in suspending the leases. This
phasing of review fits closely the expressed intent of Congress
in subjecting the analogously broad implications of lease sales to
(c)(1) review and specific plans to (c)(3) review.”66

tal Assessments and “Findings of No Significant Impact” under
NEPA, again deferring review of future exploration and development activities until submittal of EPs and DPPs.67 In March
2005, EDC and the Natural Resources Defense Council filed a
lawsuit under NEPA on behalf of several environmental organizations.68 In April 2005, MMS submitted proposed “consistency determinations” to the Coastal Commission pursuant to
the CZMA. Although MMS claimed to address future activities
that may occur on the leases, when the Coastal Commission
requested more specific information and analysis of the effects
of such activities, MMS again stated its refusal to conduct such
an evaluation at this stage in the process.
The court hearing on the NEPA claim and the Coastal Commission hearing on the CZMA issue were scheduled one day
apart in August 2005. In each case, the environmental groups
argued that MMS should not be allowed to defer review of future
activities that may occur on the leases. EDC pointed out that
NEPA requires federal agencies to consider not just the “direct
effects” of an action, but also the “indirect effects, which are
caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in
distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”69 Similarly, the
legislative history of the 1990
CZMA amendments supported
the same standard for assuring
timely review of activities that
may affect the State’s coastal
resources. The environmental
groups noted that without the
suspensions, the leases would
expire. Therefore, they argued,
the State should be allowed
to consider the full range of
impacts that may flow from such
a decision.
On August 11, 2005, the
Coastal Commission agreed that
the scope of its review encompassed all future activities on the leases.70 Accordingly, the Commission unanimously objected to the consistency determinations
submitted by MMS. The next day Judge Wilken ruled from the
bench that MMS “violated NEPA by failing to prepare environmental analyses of future exploration and development activities sunder the leases.”71 The Judge found not only that future
development activities on the leases are reasonably foreseeable,
but that the very purpose of the lease suspensions is to allow
such activities. Accordingly, the Judge remanded the matter to
MMS, ruling that the agency must complete adequate NEPA
analyses of the lease suspensions. MMS appealed this decision
and the case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
These decisions reflect the shared opinions of the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government that coastal
states should be granted the right to review any federal agency
activities that may have a direct or indirect effect on the State’s
coastal zone. This perspective—so integral to Congress’s amend-

States should be granted
the right to review any
federal agency activities
that may have a direct
or indirect effect on the
state’s coastal zone.

Aftermath of State of California v. Norton
As a result of these rulings, the leases were placed under a
“directed suspension,” meaning that all activities on the leases
were halted. In February 2005, MMS issued final Environmen57
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ments of the CZMA in 1990, and confirmed by the court’s decision in State of California v. Norton—was further endorsed by
the executive branch, under the Clinton Administration, when it
published final revisions to the CZMA regulations.72 Although
the purpose of the update was to allow a comprehensive review
of the CZMA regulations, a critical component of the new
regulations was focused on the need to comply with the 1990
amendments to the Act.
Thus, the three branches of government subscribed to the
broad right of coastal states to review activities that may affect
their coastal resources. Despite this unanimity, a change in the
executive branch muddied the waters in 2002. Under the Bush
Administration, the federal government proposed to revise the
CZMA regulations again, less than two years after the comprehensive revisions were made in December 2000. The new
regulations, which were finalized on January 5, 2006, appear to
undermine both the Congressional intent in 1990 as well as the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 2002.73 For example, the Federal Register notice announcing the new regulations characterizes OCS
lease suspensions as “interim or preliminary” and states that “in
all foreseeable instances, lease suspensions would not be subject to federal consistency review since (1) in general, they do
not authorize activities with coastal effects; and (2) if they did

contain activities with coastal effects, the activities and coastal
effects would be covered in a State’s review of a previous lease
sale, an EP or a DPP.”74 This language appears to conflict with
the 1990 CZMA amendments, which provide for early review,
similar to NEPA, so that even future, indirect effects shall be
considered in the context of a proposed federal activity.

Conclusion
As the courts have stated, the CZMA must be applied on a
case-by-case basis. There are no exclusions from state consistency review; if the facts of a particular case indicate that the proposed activity may result in a direct or indirect effect on a state’s
coastal zone, a consistency determination or certification must
be submitted to the state for review. Any limitations set forth in
the CZMA regulations must be implemented consistent with the
intent of the Act itself. Thus, if the current or any future administration attempts to rely on the 2006 regulations to limit state
review, the judicial branch may be brought into the fray again to
determine whether Congress’s intent is being undermined. In the
meantime, California and other coastal states should follow the
1990 amendments to the CZMA and the court’s interpretation of
such amendments, as set forth in State of California v. Norton.
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